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Rendering to Caesar and God: St Paul, the 
Natural Law Tradition, and the Authority of Law 
 
Abstract 
The question of the authority of law has occupied and vexed the literature and philosophy 
of law for centuries.  Law is something that characteristically implies obedience, but the 
precise nature of law’s authority remains contentious.  The return to the writings of the 
Apostle Paul in contemporary philosophy, theology and jurisprudence begs attention in 
relation to the authority of law, and so this article will consider his analysis and critique 
of law with a focus on his Epistle to the Romans.  It argues that Paul’s conception of the 
authority of law is explained on the basis that the law is from God, it externally sanctions 
obedience by virtue of the civil authorities, and it convicts internally in conscience.  This 
triad is justified by the law of love (‘love your neighbour as yourself’), and will be 
explained in relation to the natural law tradition as well as converse ideas in positivism.  
Hence, considering the reasoning of Paul in relation to traditional jurisprudential themes 
and the law of love provides a useful alternative analysis and basis for further 
investigation regarding the authority of law and the need for its obedience. 
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Then the Pharisees went and plotted how to entangle [Jesus] in his words. And they sent 
their disciples to him, along with the Herodians, saying, "Teacher, we know that you are 
true and teach the way of God truthfully, and you do not care about anyone’s opinion, for 
you are not swayed by appearances. Tell us, then, what you think. Is it lawful to pay taxes 
to Caesar, or not?" But Jesus, aware of their malice, said, "Why put me to the test, you 
hypocrites? Show me the coin for the tax." And they brought him a denarius. And Jesus 
said to them, "Whose likeness and inscription is this?" They said, "Caesar’s." Then he 
said to them, "Therefore render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and to God the 
things that are God’s." When they heard it, they marvelled. And they left him and went 
away.1 
 
The question of whether, and the basis for which, civil law is authoritative and the 
foundation for any obligation to obey it has ‘entangled’ a significant portion of legal 
philosophy and jurisprudence for centuries.  However, to answer such questions in recent 
decades, there has been a general shift in philosophy, secular theology and jurisprudence 
in the form of a return to the Apostle Paul.2  Theologian John Milbank notes that one of 
the reasons for this is philosophy required a solid foundation for truth after the precarious 
nature of the postmodern project, and the contemporary trend has been to move from 
philosophy and return to Christian theology.3  Regarding the authority of law, Donald 
Carson contends that “a fundamental shift in our self-identity has left… the judiciary in 
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particular without any sense of obligation to transcendent authority.  The result is 
pragmatism controlled by faddishness and political correctness.”4  In an effort to alleviate 
this crisis and return to a robust philosophical jurisprudence, the likes of Badiou and 
Žižek have analyzed the writings of the Apostle Paul in order to locate the necessary 
attributes to attain their hope of explicating a revolutionary, universal subjectivity beyond 
that produced by global capitalism.5    Thus, it is within this context and in this situation 
of dynamic contemporary relevance that the writings of the Apostle Paul in his Epistle to 
the Romans (as a transcendent authority) are explored in relation to the authority of law 
and obedience to it. 
 
This essay therefore argues that the authority of law can be explained in relation to a 
combination of the themes of traditional natural law in conjunction with Kelsen’s 
positivism, based on the ‘law of love’ elucidated by the Apostle Paul in Romans.  Part A 
analyzes Paul’s exposition and critique of the internal law of sin and how this affects 
conscience with regard to the existential readings of Badiou and Žižek, as well as 
considering the scholarship concerning the ‘new perspective on Paul’. It identifies Paul’s 
transition to and analysis of why the civil law should be obeyed in Romans 13, exposing 
his triad for the authority of law: the divine legislator, internal conscience and external 
sanction, justified by the law of love.  Part B explores how the Pauline triad of arguments 
and the law of love regarding authority resonates with principles found in both natural 
law (such as those espoused by Aquinas and Kant), and positivism (such as those 
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promoted by Kelsen).  Part C subsequently considers why this alternative Pauline 
formulation for the authority of law based on the law of love is useful for analysis and as 
a foundation for further investigation regarding any discussion of an obligation to obey 
the law. 
 
A The Obligation to Obey According to the Apostle Paul 
 
Paul, a self-proclaimed apostle of Jesus Christ, was a missionary sent to preach the good 
news of salvation by grace through faith to the non-Jewish nations in the mid-first 
century AD, and to establish churches among these nations.  However, while in other 
letters such as Corinthians and Ephesians Paul is writing to churches he has personally 
established, this is not the case here. Rather, Paul had not established the church at Rome, 
nor had he visited there.6  His desire to travel as an itinerant evangelist, in conjunction 
with his desire to visit the city of Rome, led him to compose a letter to the church at 
Rome.  In this letter he informed the Romans of his plans and outlined the entirety of the 
message he had been preaching as an introductory gesture, and to refute prevalent false 
teaching.  As a former Pharisee, and expert in the Jewish law, his doctrine had a natural 
emphasis on law, both divine and civil.7  Thus, Paul comprehensively sets forth his 
position on the internal and external functions of the divine and civil law in his Epistle to 
the Romans.  It is this Epistle that features prominently in the ‘return to Paul’, and it is 
therefore to this Epistle that we should return to explore Paul’s jurisprudence.  
 6 
 
I Paul and the Internal Law: The Law of Sin and Death 
 
French philosopher Alain Badiou, in his work on St Paul leading up to his exposition of 
Paul’s famous passage on the internal function of the law in Romans 7, contends that 
Paul’s fundamental thesis is that the law gives autonomy and life to the desire of the 
subject, which is attained in the form of a transgression.  The subject as such is 
constrained by the law to transgress the law, inevitably leading to death.8  Importantly, 
sin is not desire, but rather the “life of desire as autonomy” – in other words, desire itself 
has an automatic life.  Law assigns this subjective desire to a particular negative 
prohibition, resulting in the transgression of that prohibition and therefore the subject 
occupying the site of death.9  Badiou subsequently proceeds to analyze Romans 7, 
continuing to argue that desire realizes itself as sin through the prohibition of the law, and 
this de-centering of the subject from desire leads the subject to cross over to death.10  
Thus, for Badiou, Paul’s immutable conclusion is that in order to resolve this problem, 
the subject must break from the law in order to escape death, and the event that causes 
this break or rupture is Christ’s resurrection.11 
 
Slavoj Žižek also identifies this relationship between law, desire and subject, labelling it 
‘perverse’ insofar as the law itself generates the desire in the subject to violate it.12  The 
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dialectic identified by Paul between law and transgression implies that the institution of 
the law is itself the greatest transgression, and in fact the law is required in order to 
sustain the transgression.13  Thus, for Žižek, the subject is trapped in a vicious cycle 
where the prohibition instituted by the law is a sufficient condition for its transgression 
by virtue of the desire created in the subject.14  In relation to his analysis of Badiou as a 
reader of Paul, both agree that the fundamental problem of the law for Paul is how to 
break out of the vicious cycle between law, desire and transgression – the perversion 
where the law generates its own transgression and its presence is necessary to sustain the 
transgression.15  However, they differ in relation to the event or mechanism by which this 
break from the law occurs.  As mentioned above, for Badiou the event is Christ’s 
resurrection, the point where the law of death loses power.16  The public proclamation of 
Christ’s resurrection provides the possibility for life.17  However, for Žižek, according to 
Paul the entire point of Christianity is to break out from this vicious cycle of law and 
transgression via the law of love.18  It is the institution of the principle of loving your 
neighbour as yourself that guarantees the break from death, rather than the resurrection-
event providing the possibility of a break from death in Badiou’s formulation. 
 
However, the distinction is not as superficially sharp as it initially appears.  Badiou also 
notes the ostensibly contradictory statements by Paul that ‘Christ is the end of the law’ 
and ‘love fulfils the law’, and proceeds to argue that Paul reconciles these by his 
summing up of the entire law in the maxim ‘you shall love your neighbour as yourself’.19  
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As a single, affirmative statement, this maxim does not arouse the desire to transgress 
through the presence of multiple prohibitions, and therefore it satisfies the requirement of 
love fulfilling the break from the vicious cycle of law, desire and transgression.20  Badiou 
connects this with the event of Christ’s resurrection by noting the requirement that the 
maxim is subjectivated by faith, and faith is required since before the resurrection no 
subject has any reason to love themselves.21  For Badiou, faith is not mere private 
conviction, but a public declaration of the truth-event, which in this case is the 
resurrection.  It is this public declaration or subjectivation that provides the possibility of 
life for the subject, but it is only through love that this faith can actually work.22  Thus, 
similar to Žižek, Badiou argues that the ‘love your neighbour’ principle successfully 
breaks from the law of death as a ‘law’ of love, providing a sufficient condition for the 
subject’s life by allowing the working of faith, the public declaration of Christ’s 
resurrection. 
 
Both Badiou and Žižek note a significant consequence of adopting the ‘love your 
neighbour’ principle to break out of the law of death.  Žižek contends that the desire is no 
longer that of transgressing the law of prohibition, but that of fidelity to desire itself (now 
expressed in the form of the duty to love one’s neighbour as yourself) which elevates the 
duty to an ethical one that binds in conscience – to ‘Do your duty!’23  Similarly, Badiou 
states that the new faith is comprised of releasing self-love in the direction of others in a 
way made possible only by internal subjectivation or conviction.24  This internal 
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conviction takes the form of an inner voice, some transcendental authority which 
internally compels the subject to obedience.25  Douzinas observes that this new form of 
self-subjection, uniquely added by Christianity, is a willing submission by the subject, 
implying the subject is therefore bound in conscience to obey the ‘self-legislation’.26   
 
It is here that Žižek explicates his concept of ‘unplugging’, which he uses to connect the 
internal Pauline ethic of doing the duty of ‘loving one’s neighbour as yourself’ to a 
notion of the authority of the external law, or the law instituted by the civil authorities.  
The divine dimension of the external law has its being in the Ethical, and it is this 
externality (symbolic integration) which constrains internal obedience.27  This 
‘unplugging’, or disengaging oneself from the idleness that constrains the subject to 
identify with the hegemonic social order or Symbolic (read: civil law), is not a merely 
inner contemplative stance, but an active work of love which leads to an alternative 
community – a community whose fidelity is primarily to God, and obedience to the 
external civil law is secondary.28  However, since it is the external civil law where the 
divine interaction transpires, obedience to the external civil law (the established 
Symbolic) is paradoxically rendered necessary for this alternative community.  Hence, 
subsequent to his exposition of the law and sin and the solution of love, we find Paul 
commanding the new alternative community of Christians to be subject to the civil 
authorities: the law of love and fidelity to God necessitates it.29  Thus, the civil law 
should be obeyed as a function of adhering to the duty to love your neighbour as yourself, 
 10 
the ultimate fulfilling of and breaking out of the cycle of law, desire and transgression 
created by the law of death.  
 
The analysis above demonstrates that law’s authority does not stem from an infinite 
number of negative prohibitions.  Paul comprehensively demonstrates this structure to 
inevitably result in transgression rather than obedience.  As such, mere prohibition does 
not produce an obligation to obey – indeed, it could be said that it produces an obligation 
to disobey as the prohibition itself generates the desire to transgress it.  Paul’s alternative 
formulation is that law is authoritative by virtue of a single, transcendental positive axiom 
appropriated by faith in the resurrection: namely, to love your neighbour as yourself.  The 
transcendental aspect of the axiom is vital for Paul, as it is the inner transcendental voice 
corresponding to the axiom which compels the subject to obedience.  The implications of 
this new perspective will be explored more fully in the final part. 
 
For now, these existentialist readings of Paul by the likes of Badiou and Žižek beg 
important questions of consistency regarding the broader interpretation of Paul’s thought 
on the law, and so this article turns to consider the contentions of an important vein of 
contemporary Pauline scholarship in this area, or what is known as the ‘new perspective 
on Paul’.  E.P. Sanders, J.D.G Dunn and N.T. Wright are the primary authors generally 
associated with this so-called ‘new perspective’, and so these require special attention.30  
The movement, coined by Dunn, argues that Paul has traditionally been interpreted in an 
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anachronistic Reformed context, and thus this traditional perspective has misunderstood 
the role of the law in Jewish soteriology.31  According to Dunn, for Paul the role of the 
law was to identify and maintain Israel’s privileged and separate status as compared to 
other nations.  Dunn argues that Paul attacks this role of the law by contending that in 
Christ, Jew and Gentile are united by faith, and hence the function of the law is 
obsolete.32  Wright agrees that Paul’s polemic against the law in Galatians is a polemic 
against the Jewish law which is the national charter of the Jewish race, the Torah.  This 
law is one stage in God’s plan, and that stage is now complete, and will make way for a 
new stage, which is Christ and the law of the Spirit.33  He contends that the law refers to 
particular actions by the Jewish covenant community which distinguished them from 
other nations.34 
 
In particular, Dunn argues that what Paul means by the law is specifically the Jewish 
Torah, or works of the covenant between God and the Jews, such as circumcision.35  
Hence, people are not justified by the law in terms of performing the covenant works, but 
are instead justified on the basis of faith in Christ. Indeed, in Christ, the covenant is 
fulfilled and broadened not just to Jews, but to all people, and this is given by the new 
way of the Spirit.  So the distinctively Jewish character of works of the law should not be 
relied on or continued, for this is to ignore the central fact that God’s covenant purpose 
for all people is that they should be justified by faith in Christ and live by the Spirit and 




Importantly, Dunn cites Sanders as one of the major inspirations and pioneers of the new 
perspective, and seeks to clarify, strengthen and extend the perspective opened by 
Sanders.37  According to Sanders, one of Paul’s main arguments in Galatians in relation 
to the law is that Gentile Christians are not required to keep the Jewish Torah in order to 
be considered part of the Christian community.  Nor, in fact, are the Jewish Christians – 
but they may if they wish.  Hence, Paul’s central focus is on Christian relations between 
Jew and Gentile in regard to the Jewish law, and his primary objection to mandating 
adherence to the law for Christian believers is because the law brings a curse and 
righteousness or obedience/law’s authority must be by faith, excluding the law.38   
 
In the final analysis then, though God is responsible for giving the law, it was never his 
plan for the law to produce righteousness.  Instead, the law curses and leads to 
transgression, and righteousness is by faith for both Jews and Gentiles.39  Fundamentally, 
Sanders argues, Paul’s problem with the law is that it does not provide for God’s ultimate 
purpose, which is salvation for all through faith in Christ.40  As such, Paul connected the 
law inextricably with sin and saw it as a negative component of God’s plan of salvation, 
despite the fact God provided it and gave the law.  This constraining and enslaving force 
of the law lasted until the coming of faith and was given for the purpose of leading to 
faith.  The law was given by God for the purpose of condemning all and preparing for the 
redemption provided by faith.41   
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II Paul and the External Law: God, Civil Authority and Sanction 
 
Although we have seen how the readings by Badiou and Žižek connect Paul’s discussion 
of the law of sin earlier in Romans to his discussion of obedience to the civil law in 
Romans 13, one may be apt to wonder if the new perspective on Paul, with its focus on 
Jewish Torah and covenant, allows such a connection to be made.  According to Sanders, 
when Paul says that the law kills, he means all the law – Sanders notes that Paul appears 
to make no distinction between the ritual law and the moral law.42  The law of God is the 
whole law, given by God and connected with sin.43  One could presume that this also 
includes the civil law, both that of the Jews in the Torah, and that of the Gentiles which 
Romans 13 discusses.  In all cases, the law of love fulfils the law, both civil and 
ceremonial, Jew and Gentile – or so the argument may go.   
 
In fact, Sanders goes further, and explicitly connects fulfilling the Torah through the law 
of love with fulfilling the Roman civil law through the law of love, not making any 
distinction between the function of the two.44  This implies that in Paul’s mind and the 
Jewish context, the question of the authority of law could not be divided with reference to 
the type of law considered.45  Paul’s contention is that the law should be fulfilled, 
including ceremonial, moral and civil law, and the method of fulfilling it is by the law of 
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love.  Consequently, such admonitions by Paul in regard to the civil law are remarkably 
in accord with the Torah and Jewish tradition.46  Sanders even goes so far as to state that: 
Since the point is not controversial… Rom. 13:8-10 makes no obvious distinction 
between the law that Christians should obey and the Mosaic law. There Paul not 
only quotes Lev. 19:18, but also itemizes four of the Ten Commandments and 
adds "and any other commandment" as being included in Lev. 19:18.47   
 
It is therefore not inconsistent with Paul’s Jewish content and heritage to apply his 
discussion of the Torah in Romans 3-8 to his discussion of the civil law in Romans 13:1-
10.  Indeed, the general view in Judaism is that God ordained all parts of the law, and 
rejecting any of the law was tantamount to rejecting God himself.48   
 
This argument may be further strengthened by considering how Paul uses the law of love 
as the foundation for obeying the civil law in Romans 13, just as he uses the law of love 
as the foundation for obeying or fulfilling the Torah.  Firstly, Paul explains in verses 8-10 
that love fulfils the law because it does no wrong to a neighbour.  If one loves their 
neighbour, they will not murder them or steal from them and so forth according to the 
commandments of the Torah, and therefore love fulfils the law.  In verses seven and 
eight, he explicitly provides the foundation for obedience to the civil law by stating that 
one should render to all what is owed to them, particularly taxes, revenue, respect and 
honour.  This is specifically addressing the issue of paying taxes to the civil authorities 
(who make and enforce the civil laws), and so the argument is that since the civil 
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authorities will fulfil the law by ensuring it is obeyed, according to verse eight we should 
obey the law as a function of love by giving the civil authorities the taxes they are owed, 
which then fulfils the law.  Thus, the fulfilling (which refers to obedience) of the law has 
its basis in the law of love. 
 
Secondly, the law of love is implicitly invoked in verse two, where obedience of the civil 
law is premised on the fact that the civil law is ultimately instituted by God, so that 
disobeying the civil law is equivalent to disobeying God.  Since the law of love includes 
obeying God as a function of that love, Paul is essentially saying that when one is 
fulfilling or obeying the civil law, they are effectively loving God by being obedient to 
him.  Hence, the law of love fulfils the civil law.  Finally, the law of love is the 
contextual precondition of obedience to the civil authorities in the passage immediately 
preceding Romans 13:1-10.  In Romans 12:17-21, Paul states that one should not repay 
evil for evil, but overcome evil with good, doing good to one’s enemies and loving them.  
This is the essence of the law of love, and its most extreme application – in the context of 
the law of love, Christ in Luke 10:25-37 explains in the Parable of the Good Samaritan 
that one’s neighbour can be even their most bitter enemy.  Thus, to avenge one’s enemy 
is contrary to the law of love, and so Paul implies that instead of taking personal revenge, 
one should be subject to the civil authorities.  Since the law of love is Paul’s argument for 
not taking personal revenge, it follows that the law of love is the foundation for the 
fulfilling of the civil law in Romans 13.  Therefore, the law of love not only transforms 
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and redeems the Old Testament law, but also provides the foundation for the authority of 
and obedience to the civil law. 
 
To reiterate, Paul first identifies the problem of the law of sin, and how the prohibitions 
contained in the law generate and sustain the transgression of the law, inevitably leading 
to death.  His solution to this problem is the axiom to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’, 
which fulfils the requirements of the law and gives it authority without creating the desire 
to transgress it through the existence of prohibitions.  Paul subsequently proceeds to 
explain how this law of love not only compels internal obedience, but also external 
obedience – obedience to the civil authorities.  It is on this basis that we proceed to 
specifically consider Paul’s statements regarding obedience to the civil authorities in 
Romans 13:1-7. 
 
Superficially, Paul’s position and argument in this passage seems straightforward and 
unequivocal.  In verse one, he states that all persons should be subject to the civil 
authorities because they receive their power from God and have been instituted by God.  
So those who resist the authorities resist God and incur his wrath in the form of 
punishment by the authorities.49  However, submission should not merely be for the sake 
of avoiding punishment, but also because of conscience, for obedience and honour are 
due to the civil authorities by virtue of their position.50  In conjunction with this being 
consistent with the reading provided by the new perspective on Paul above, this was the 
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stance of prominent Reformed theologians Martin Luther and John Calvin.  Luther, 
basing his contentions on the principle of loving your neighbour as yourself as 
established in the previous part, states that Christians should readily submit themselves to 
be governed by ‘the Sword’ (or by sanction) as an act of loving one’s neighbour, and 
furthermore Christians should submit themselves to the governing authorities as they are 
good by virtue of the fact God has instituted them.51  Calvin agrees, and argues that both 
the civil authorities and the punishments they give are directly from God Himself, and 
should therefore be adhered to.52 
 
Others assert that Paul is being more subtle in this passage, to the extent that he is 
communicating an ambivalent or even contradictory message to the explicitly stated one.  
For example, Taubes states that Romans 13 is solely pragmatic, and is a result of Paul’s 
apocalyptic nihilism which simultaneously avoids overt civil disobedience while refusing 
to grant legitimacy to the governing authorities.53  Carter reads the passage ironically, 
viewing Paul’s surface meaning as an ironic subversion of the authorities it appears to 
commend.54  However, these readings are difficult to sustain, even upon deeper textual, 
contextual and lexical examinations of the passage.  In addition to the arguments given 
above from the Jewish and Reformed perspectives, Coleman analyzes the passage in 
relation to significant Greek words, and argues that obedience to the civil authorities is an 
issue of morality rather than politics, since the authorities are God’s servants and thus 
Christians have binding tangible obligations (taxes and tributes) and intangible 
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obligations (reverence and honour) they must render to the civil authorities.55  This does 
not imply a disjunct between the authority of law and obedience to it, but instead affirms 
that the authority of law stems from a moral obligation to obey it.  Furthermore, Paul’s 
additional exhortations to pray for civil authorities and to be good citizens imply that an 
ironic or ambivalent intention on the part of Paul in Romans 13:1-7 is highly 
implausible.56  Thus, Paul is essentially arguing that people should be subject to the civil 
authorities because these are established by God and to avoid punishment from God in 
the form of punishment by the authorities, and for the sake of conscience. 
 
III  Paul’s Triad for the Authority of Law 
 
From what has been previously established, Paul’s argument for the authority of the civil 
law in Romans 13:1-7 has three components and proceeds as follows: firstly, all people 
should be subject to the civil authorities because they have received their power from 
God and have been instituted by him.  From the existential readings of Badiou and Žižek, 
this divine dimension of the external law has its being in the Ethical, and therefore is 
intrinsically connected with the conviction of conscience to do one’s duty described 
below, where fidelity to God requires obedience to the civil law.  From Reformed and 
Jewish readings of Paul, all law, both civil and Torah, has been given and instituted by 
God, and to disobey this law is in effect to disobey God as the one who has instituted it.  
Secondly, the authorities have been given the power to punish those who disobey them as 
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a function of their authority from God, implying that they are manifesting God’s wrath 
against the one who breaks the law by punishing that person.  The Reformed and Jewish 
readings of Paul particularly emphasize this aspect, but from slightly different 
perspectives.  The Reformed (or ‘old’) perspective emphasizes the sovereignty of God as 
dispensing punishment for disobedience to laws or civil authorities he has instituted, 
while the Jewish perspective focuses on punishment being meted out by the community 
for such disobedience. 57  Nevertheless, for our purposes it seems apparent that the 
perspectives agree on the central fact that according to Paul, the law should be obeyed 
since God has delegated authority to the civil society for the purpose of punishing those 
who disobey the law. 
 
Finally, persons should not be subject to the civil authorities merely to avoid God’s wrath 
in the form of civil sanction, but also for the sake of conscience, because to disobey the 
law of the land is to disobey God himself as the one who has instituted them.  The issue 
of conscience, though very much emphasized in the readings of Badiou and Žižek as 
central in the obedience to and authority of the divine law, is less clear in Paul’s Jewish 
context.  In Romans 2:14-15, Paul discusses a kind of natural law that enables those 
without the law (the Gentiles) to do the acts required by the law through the law written 
on their hearts, or through their conscience.  However, this is specifically for those 
without the law or Torah, and would therefore appear not to be applicable in the Jewish 
context of obedience to the civil law.  This insight is critical, for it allows what is in fact a 
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limitation of the law under the old covenant to be exposed.  In contrast to this, under the 
new covenant, the law is written on the hearts of all people, both Jew and Gentile, and 
this law is the law of love or the Spirit, which fulfils the Torah and brings God’s 
complete plan of redemption to fruition.58  Hence, according to the new covenant 
articulated by Paul, and in contrast to the Jewish Torah, both Jew and Gentile will obey 
the civil law as a function of conscience, governed by the law of love instituted by God.   
 
For Paul, these three factors should result in the citizen rendering the civil authorities 
what is due to them: taxes, tributes, reverence and honour.59  It follows from this triad 
that the authority of law ultimately stems from a divine obligation to obey it.  This is not 
incompatible with the notion of a single transcendental positive axiom being authoritative 
as described above, but rather Paul justifies the triad with the principle to love one’s 
neighbour in the verses that immediately follow.  This line of reasoning also 
complements the new perspective emphasis on Paul’s Jewish context, for his discussion 
of law as alternating between Torah and Roman civil law can be consistently understood 
due to their essential equivalence, in conjunction with the fact that both are governed and 
fulfilled by the law of love.  Consequently, in the next part, each component of Paul’s 
argument, justified by the law of love, will be explored in the context of their connection 
with themes found in traditional natural law and positivism, hence providing an 
alternative perspective for further investigation into the authority of law. 
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B  Law as Divine and State Authority: Paul’s Natural Positivism 
 
I The ‘Divine’ Civil Law 
 
The first horn of the Pauline triad, that the civil law should be obeyed by virtue of its 
divine institution, will be explored in relation to traditional themes of natural law in this 
section.  The most significant writer in traditional approaches to natural law was the 
medieval theologian Thomas Aquinas, who identified four types of law: eternal law, 
divine law, natural law and human or positive law.60  For Aquinas, the human or positive 
law is derived directly from the speculations of human reason guided by the natural law 
inherent in humanity, which is in turn a participation in the eternal law of God, insofar as 
human reason has been illuminated by the divine law.61  Consequently, the human law 
must necessarily conform to the natural law in order for it to fully constitute a law that 
invokes a binding moral obligation to obey it.62  Aquinas also acknowledges that the law 
makes use of fear of punishment in order to ensure obedience.63  Despite this, if the 
human law does not conform to the natural law, it lacks the requisite moral force to 
oblige obedience.  It is from this notion that Aquinas contends that an ‘unjust law’ (a 
human law that does not accord with natural law which is part of the law of God) does 
not require obedience.64  Thus, the authority of human law for Aquinas is that it 
prescribes a standard of virtue and good principles based on natural law (ultimately, the 
eternal law), and it is this that should be obeyed, rather than obedience to the institution 
of law itself.65 
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This brief summary of the Thomist framework for law belies the extent of contemporary 
disputation over what precisely Aquinas meant in articulating this framework.  To plunge 
into the depths of this discourse is beyond the scope of this article, but it is hoped that by 
briefly outlining a genealogy of Aquinas’ thought, followed by consideration of some of 
the different perspectives, we may arrive at a reasonably plausible foundation for 
understanding Thomist jurisprudence in the context of the Pauline triad proposed above.  
To begin, Aquinas quotes Augustine as an authority for stating that there exists an eternal 
law, which is supreme reason and unchangeable.  Similarly, Aquinas argues on the basis 
of Augustine that there is a distinction between the eternal law and the temporal law, 
which is called human law.  Humans may access the eternal law through reason, which is 
sharing in the eternal reason, and this participation is the natural law from which may 
stem human or positive law.  Hence, following Augustine the eternal law is imprinted in 
us by God through nature.66   
 
Aquinas also argues that human laws which adhere to the natural law do bind in 
conscience through being part of the eternal law of God.  However, those which do not 
adhere to the natural law fail to bind in conscience, and so are not really laws.  He cites 
Augustine’s statement that “a law that is not just seems to be no law at all” in order to 
justify his further contention the force of a law depends on its justice, or whether it is 
from God. 67  Aquinas, further using Augustine, argues that the new law is unwritten, and 
on the human heart.  This is the law of faith and of the Spirit.68  This new law is also the 
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law of love, which contains the old law and fulfils it.69  Ultimately then, according to 
Aquinas and following Augustine, the laws of the secular state have their justification and 
authority from the fact that they are part of the eternal and natural law of love – or, in 
other words, that they are given by God.70 
 
Given Aquinas’ apparently heavy reliance on Augustine, it is worthwhile considering 
Augustine’s own framework for natural law.  He contends that in order to live in peace, a 
person subordinates their primal tendencies to the rational soul.  However, divine 
direction is required to know what to do, and divine assistance is required to obey.  Hence 
a person requires faith, in order to view obedience and consequent peace in the context of 
the everlasting law, and to be in subjection to this law for the good of the society.  The 
basis for this is two precepts taught by God – to love God, and to love one’s neighbour as 
themselves.  If one follows these, it will result in obedience to the law of society and 
peace in that society.71 
 
From the Roman jurist Cicero particularly, Augustine adopted the Stoic notion of natural 
law and the eternal law (or, as he terms it, ‘everlasting law’) as the supreme moral norm, 
and the sublime rational orderliness which characterizes the universe and is instituted by 
God – in other words, the divine wisdom is the universal law.  Augustine distinguishes 
between the human or temporal law and this eternal law, which is the supreme immutable 
reason and must always be obeyed.  Hence, the eternal law is the ultimate norm or 
standard for the eternal law.72  This theistic (in contrast to the Stoic) definition of the 
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natural law became the basic concept and authoritative pronouncement of law for 
medieval jurisprudence, and was most notably adopted and extended by Thomas 
Aquinas.73  The eternal law manifests itself in the eternal reason of all created reason, and 
so humans are governed by and are aware of this eternal law through the eternal reason.  
This participation of rational man in the eternal law by the law of reason is the natural 
law, and even the person who does not acknowledge God may nevertheless appropriate 
the eternal law through rational participation.74  The primary content and principle of the 
natural law for Augustine, and later for Aquinas, is the so-called Golden Rule to do 
nothing unto another that you would not do unto yourself.75 
 
Focusing on Cicero particularly as a major influence for Augustine, and therefore by 
extension for Aquinas, the natural law is the law of a harmonious Stoic universe which 
could be objectively perceived and is reflected in human nature.  Brooks notes that this 
view of natural law has been explicitly adopted by the likes of Aquinas, as well as John 
Finnis.76  This law is eternal and rational, immutable and supreme, part of the divine 
reason and from God.  Those who do not observe it are rebellious against their own 
nature and will suffer penalties.77  In the context of this article as proposing that Paul’s 
thought yields the triad described above, it is pertinent that Crowe observes a plausible 
influence for Paul in the Stoic philosophy of the natural law.  In fact, the early church 
fathers such as Augustine seemed quite satisfied to view Paul as articulating a theory of 
natural law similar to that of Cicero.  This natural law was of course put into a Christian 
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framework, and the law of love (essentially seen as equivalent to the ‘Golden Rule’) 
especially was viewed as epitomising the essence of the natural law.78 
 
Indeed, Aquinas himself uses Paul’s statements in Romans 2:14-15, that the Gentiles do 
by nature what is commanded in the law since it is written on their hearts and guided by 
their conscience, as his foundation for articulating the natural law, and argues that Paul is 
here using law in two senses.  The first is the Jewish Torah, and the second is the natural 
moral law, written on the hearts of all people.  The statement by Paul emphasizes two 
fundamental aspects of natural law appropriated by Aquinas: its foundation upon nature 
and its immediacy to human conscience.  It is also universal in the sense that it is 
appropriated by all humans.79  Hence, even without revelation and in a fallen state, 
human reason is able to frame general principles of right action as a matter of practical 
reason, as opposed to the speculative reason of ontology.80  Aquinas also quotes the 
Apostle Paul in Romans 13 as support for his contention that all human law is from God, 
so that those who disobey the law in effect disobey God, and so are bound in 
conscience.81 
 
Therefore, as far as a brief, purely historical analysis goes, Aquinas’ thought and 
genealogy in regard to natural law and the authority of law appear to be consistent with 
the triad identified above in Paul’s thought – indeed, Aquinas quotes Paul on several 
occasions in order to justify his contentions that the law is divinely instituted and that it 
convicts in conscience.  Both Paul and Aquinas appear to be significantly influenced by 
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Cicero, particularly as they agree with Cicero on the issue of punishment or the suffering 
of penalties if the law is not obeyed, implying the authority of law as a matter of its being 
part of the eternal reason.  Most importantly, there seems to be a common understanding 
that the content of the law and its justification is contained in the law of love, to love 
one’s neighbour as oneself or to do unto others as you would have them do unto you.  
Cicero, operating in the pre-Christian era, obviously does not explicitly articulate this 
principle, but agrees that the natural law is the “supreme moral norm”, which Augustine 
and Aquinas, following Paul, elaborate to be the law of love. 
 
However, the question remains as to whether contemporary perspectives regarding 
Aquinas are equally consistent with this historical construal and the proposed Pauline 
triad, especially in the context of the discussion in relation to Hans Kelsen and Immanuel 
Kant (as articulating a more positivist or secular jurisprudence) later in this article.  These 
perspectives are many and varied, but it is hoped that a brief sample will suffice in order 
to establish the argument that Aquinas, Kelsen and Kant can be consistently understood 
as individual theoretical components of the proposed Pauline triad.  For example, Stanley 
Hauerwas as an interpreter of Aquinas avoids using the phrase natural law since it is 
often misconceived, misunderstood, and ambiguously adopted by its various proponents.  
Instead, he argues for the adoption of a Christian morality through the language of virtue, 
which is able to form Christian character and produce legally beneficial action, or 
obedience to the law.82  Aquinas did not discuss natural law to supply an objective 
account of ‘natural’ morality, but because he needed a principle to assist him in 
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interpreting the various precepts found in Scripture.  His treatise on law was in the 
specific context of developing an account of human activity as formed by virtue.83  
Indeed, Aquinas views the human use of reason, which allows universal participation in 
the eternal law, as itself a virtue, and as a function of being a virtuous person or person of 
good character.84   
 
It is certainly indisputable that Aquinas frames much of his discussion of natural law in 
terms of virtue.  Indeed, as mentioned above, the authority of human law for Aquinas is 
that it prescribes a standard of virtue and good principles based on natural law.  However, 
without wishing to engage in an extended debate regarding Thomist semantics, it seems 
equally clear from the above that for Aquinas, this virtue and its resulting obedience to 
civil law is based on the authority of the natural law, such that the two cannot be easily 
divorced.  Hence, at least for the purpose of this article, one can happily agree with 
Hauerwas without it materially affecting the interpretation of Aquinas, except for the 
sake of employing the phrase ‘natural law’. 
 
The more substantive problematic appears to be located in the question of just how 
‘theological’ the Thomist account really is, and to what extent faith is required to 
appropriate it.  On one side of the dispute, John Milbank argues that the natural law of 
Thomas Aquinas is intrinsically theological and transcendent, in contrast with the secular 
modern law in its being positivistic and immanent.85  For Milbank, medieval modes of 
governance avoided the danger of biopolitics, since the resort to unlegislated power was 
 28 
seen as necessary in those instances where the written law no longer served justice.  In 
other words, following the model of Aquinas, appeal was made to a natural law of equity 
rooted in an eternal, divine law, and so provides an escape from biopolitics to some 
degree.86  Milbank concludes that the only final way out of the biopolitical conundrum is 
through authentic Pauline theology, which allegedly provides the theological framework 
for Thomist natural law.87 
 
Milbank’s framework for understanding reality, and consequently for interpreting 
Aquinas, is that accounts of human life, law and nature must be integrally theological, 
and this entails the rejection of any recognition of the secular or a ‘pure nature’.  The 
problem for Milbank’s view is that according to him, authentic knowledge comes from 
faith alone, but this is by no means a judgment shared by Aquinas.88  Indeed, quite 
contrary to Milbank’s contentions, Aquinas appears to allow secular participation in the 
natural law and the eternal law through human reason.  This eternal law is objectively 
available and able to be apprehended by all who rationally participate.  Moreover, 
Aquinas’ intellectual genealogy of Augustine and Cicero regarding natural law advocate 
this notion of ‘pure nature’ which can be perceived by human reason apart from 
revelation, so that all people can participate in the natural law.  Even Paul, by referring to 
the ‘natural law’ of the Gentiles in Romans 2, emphasizes the way in which all people, 
those with or without faith, can universally and immediately access the natural law.  




On the other side of the spectrum is John Finnis, who claims that Aquinas considers the 
natural law to be self-evident, but that the existence of God is not self-evident, and that 
his will cannot be discovered without revelation.  Hence Finnis articulates a theory of 
natural law without needing to revert to questions of God’s existence and will.89  Finnis 
states that according to Aquinas, a positive or human law is derived from the natural law 
by a deductive process, and obtains its force from the natural law, which Finnis defines as 
the set of principles of practical reasonableness which order human life and community.90  
From a historical perspective, Finnis also alludes to the fact that Cicero, Augustine and 
Aquinas all espouse a principle similar to ‘an unjust law is not law’.91  Finnis further 
discusses the origin of the phrase ‘natural law’ in Cicero and the Stoics, emphasising that 
a primary use of natura refers to practical reason according to human nature.92  Hence for 
Finnis, according to Aquinas, even though the eternal law is from God, human 
apprehension of the eternal law by the natural law is through human reason.93 
 
In Finnis’ favour, this account agrees with Aquinas’ intellectual geneaology of Augustine 
and Cicero, and is also more compatible with the positivist account of the authority of 
law contained in Kelsen, which is argued in this article to be part of Paul’s triad for the 
authority of law in Romans 13.  However, Weinreb and Porter reject such an 
interpretation of Aquinas, for according to them Finnis claims that the Thomist natural 
law theory is not ontological, and is severable from Aquinas’ context of the eternal law of 
God.  This is to radically distort the Thomist framework, and to misconceive the fact that 
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the natural law exists on the basis of the eternal law and eternal reason rationally ordering 
the universe – in other words, for Weinreb and Porter, Finnis’ account of natural law in 
Aquinas is not theological enough.94 
 
Jean Porter in particular seeks a more balanced approach than either Milbank or Finnis, 
arguing that the usual approaches to natural law, and particularly to Aquinas, are too 
focused on philosophy to the neglect of theology, the scholastics, and Scripture.  To 
redress this balance, she seeks to articulate a theological account of the natural law 
through the accounts of the scholastics (and especially Aquinas), in order to properly 
incorporate Scripture, as well as provide a bridge to other perspectives.95  In this aspect, 
Porter’s approach has much to commend it, and this article could well be seen as a 
similar type of approach, in the sense that it includes Scripture and is generous toward the 
scholastics, yet acknowledges the non-theological elements of natural law theory, 
providing a bridge between perspectives.  Indeed, this is the precise argument of the 
article in terms of what Paul appears to do in Romans.   
 
In saying this, it is Finnis who nevertheless appears to provide the best understanding of 
Thomist natural law in the context of Paul’s triad for the authority of law.  The criticism 
that Finnis’ account is not theological enough is actually the strength which enables it to 
be the most appropriate framework for considering Aquinas as part of Paul’s triad for the 
authority of law, insofar as this triad contains both (theological) natural law and positivist 
elements.  Moreover, at least for the purposes of this article, the account provided by 
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Finnis is manifestly theological without being theological in the totalising sense espoused 
by Milbank.  For example, according to Finnis, the term ‘natural’ law and the consequent 
distinction between ‘natural’ reason and revelation drawn by some theologians has given 
credence to the supposition that the term ‘natural’ signifies immanence and secularism at 
the expense of transcendence or the supernatural.96  However, Finnis rejects such a 
supposition as “muddled”, arguing that what Plato, Aristotle and others mean by nature 
actually implies participation in the divine intellect and divine reason, entailing faith in 
the existence of God (however one conceives God to be).  Hence, the assertion of 
objective norms of human flourishing and principles of human reasonableness lead to the 
affirmation of some transcendent source of these, which the philosophers term ‘God’.97  
Hence, reason is something God-given, and practical reasonableness entails the imitation 
of God.  Moreover, the basic values grasped by practical reason gain an objectivity, 
constancy, and impartiality reinforced by faith in God.98   
 
Therefore, the Thomist argument for the authority of law has numerous parallels with the 
Pauline argument stated above.  Most fundamentally, both agree that the authority of the 
civil (or positive/human) law is derived from its divine institution.  For Aquinas, this was 
apprehended universally either through knowledge of the divine law (specific revelation 
from God) or by the natural law (human reason), which could never conflict since they 
are subsets of the eternal law of God.  Thus, the civil law obliges obedience since it 
ultimately derives its authority from God.99  Similarly for Paul, as he states in Romans 
13, the civil authorities should be obeyed as a function of rendering obedience to God.   
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However, one area where Paul and Aquinas disagree (at least superficially) is the issue of 
civil disobedience.  For Aquinas, in the event that a human law does not accord with 
God’s law, it is not a law in essence and therefore one is not obliged to obey it.100  
However, Paul in Romans is silent on the issue of civil disobedience.  He simply states 
that the civil authorities must be obeyed.  The only sign of a limit to this seemingly 
ubiquitous authority of the civil government is in Romans 13:7, where Paul says to pay to 
all what is owed to them.  It could be argued that this allows Paul to say that if obedience 
is not owed to the civil authorities, it is not necessary to render obedience to them. 
 
In fact, Paul does something similar in the subsequent verse, though in an esoterically 
paradoxical way.  After commanding the Romans to pay to all what is owed, he 
immediately says to not owe anything except love, which fulfils the law.  Hence, the 
command to owe obedience is simultaneously negated and fulfilled by love.101  It is 
important to note that Paul is not advocating universal civil disobedience – the effective 
abolition of the civil authorities.  Rather, as discussed above in relation to the internal 
law, it is not a series of negative commands and prohibitions that will result in obedience 
to the external law, but a single transcendental (divine) positive principle: to love one’s 
neighbour.  This accords with the Thomist position, specifically that held by Hauerwas, 
that the authority of law prescribes a standard of virtue (the law of love) based on natural 
law, rather than obedience to law itself. 
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In short, it is through love that the civil authorities should be obeyed, for that is what is 
owed to them and fellow citizens.  Paul therefore allows the possibility that the civil 
authorities may be disobeyed if it is contrary to love to obey them.102  Thus, the 
transcendental and divinely instituted principle of the law of love provides a justification 
for obeying the civil authorities, and the possibility of disobeying them if their laws are 
contrary to the law of love.  Nevertheless, contrary to Aquinas, human laws that are 
against the law of love (or the eternal law) are still valid laws.  In this way, the divinely 
instituted Pauline law of love transcends the mere command to obey the authorities (but 
necessarily achieves the same result) while simultaneously upholding the divine 
prerogative to punish those who disobey the authorities, even if they are unjust. 
 
In the final analysis, in accordance with Paul’s triad for the authority of law in Romans 
13, Thomist natural law can be theologically understood in terms of being from God and 
instituted by God, with punishment from God through the civil authorities for 
disobedience.  Yet this law may be appropriated universally and has positivistic and 
immanent elements so that it can stand in a consistent relation with the particular 
articulations of Kant in terms of conscience and Kelsen in terms of the law of love as the 
basic norm.  Most importantly, as explained above, such a natural law theory is consistent 
with a new perspective interpretation of Paul in Romans, so that Paul can be plausibly 




II The Law of Love as the Basic Norm 
 
This part will examine the second horn of the Pauline triad for the authority of the civil 
law more specifically in relation to Hans Kelsen’s positivism.  Similarities can be seen 
between the positivistic concept of the Grundnorm (or basic norm) proposed by Hans 
Kelsen, and the Pauline axiom to ‘love your neighbour as yourself’.  For Kelsen, the idea 
of the basic norm is a presupposed, fundamental norm that authorizes and founds any 
coherent and valid legal system.  It gives meaning to a legal system and bestows the legal 
power to create such a system.103  Kelsen himself notes that the law of love is an example 
of the basic norm, illustrating that the neighbour principle contains content from which 
other norms can be logically deduced, resulting in the establishment of an entire system 
of valid norms.104 
 
Paul firstly demonstrates in Romans 7 that a legal system lacking the basic norm has a 
privation of authority, and is therefore doomed to fail.  An endless array of invalid 
negative prohibitions creates the desire in the subject to transgress, rather than 
compelling them to obey.  The Torah was such a system, a structure that existed as a set 
of norms without authorisation or authority, and therefore did not possess an inherent 
obligation to obey.  Furthermore, as explained in the new perspective, the Torah was 
never designed to bring salvation, but instead to bring a curse as a preparation for the law 
of faith.  Consequently, as the solution, Paul invigorated the law and created a foundation 
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for it by posing the law of love.  As a single affirmative principle, it is the typical 
paradigm of the basic norm. 
 
The most powerful example of this is found in Romans 13:8-10.  In this passage 
immediately following Paul’s injunction to render obedience to the civil authorities, he 
clarifies this by stating that this should be achieved by loving one another, for love fulfils 
the law.  He proceeds to show that the commandments (negative prohibitions) are all 
summed up by the law of love: to love your neighbour as yourself.  Thus, as explained 
above, Paul is arguing that in addition to the reasons given in Romans 13:1-7, the civil 
authorities should be obeyed as a function of the law of love.  However, his argument 
goes even further than this, tacitly asserting that the law of love is presupposed and 
fundamental – it precedes even the commandments.  Paul demonstrates this by quoting 
the law of love from the Torah.105  As such, he shows that it is not a Pauline or even 
Christological innovation, but is the basis and fulfilment of the Mosaic Law.   
 
Furthermore, the law of love legitimizes and validates the commandment system in 
conjunction with the civil authorities, for Paul uses it to justify his instruction to obey 
them by stating that this law of love fulfils obedience.  It is the law of love that vindicates 
and gives meaning to the civil authorities and the series of commandments by ultimately 
transcending and fulfilling them.  Paul also demonstrates that the law of love provides the 
content from which an entire system of valid norms can be logically deduced.  In Romans 
13:10, he states that love does no wrong to a neighbour.  In this way, all the 
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commandments such as not to murder and steal and the like are contained by this 
principle, since if you love your neighbour according to Paul you will not murder them or 
steal from them.  Therefore, the axiom to love your neighbour as yourself provides the 
content of ‘doing no wrong to a neighbour’ from which a series of norms can be 
promulgated.   
 
At this point, the new perspective on Paul provides what is an important insight in 
understanding the potential connection between Paul’s triad and Kelsen’s basic norm.  
When Paul speaks of the law, with a few exceptions he means the Jewish Torah.  These 
exceptions, for example ‘the law of the Spirit’ or ‘the law of faith’, refer to the principle 
of faith or love.  They have also been understood to mean ‘rule’ or ‘norm’.106  Hence, it is 
entirely consistent with Paul’s Jewish context for the triad for the authority of law to be 
based upon the ‘law’, ‘principle’, ‘rule’, or ‘norm’ of love, particularly with Kelsen 
having acknowledged the law of love as a type of basic norm which provides the 
authority for law.  Thus, Kelsen’s basic norm bears great similarity and exhibits features 
characteristic of the Pauline law of love as described above, as well as exhibiting 
consistency with the Thomist framework in the sense that for Aquinas, the content of the 
natural law providing authority for the human legal system is the law of love.  In this 
way, the notion of the law of love as a single, divine positive principle (constituting the 
basic norm in Kelsen’s jurisprudence) is a useful alternative foundation for exploring the 
authority of law. 
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III  The Internal Conviction of Conscience 
 
Finally, the third horn of the Pauline triad, that the civil authorities should be obeyed 
because of an internal conviction of conscience, will be explored in relation to Kantian 
natural law in this section.  Kant proposed that all authoritative law is ascertainable by 
virtue of practical reason, inherent in all humanity.  It is through practical reason that 
people hold moral feelings or legislated laws.107  For Kant, the obligation to obey law is 
internal: the categorical imperative, which is to act as if the principle of your action were 
to become a universal law of nature.108  This categorical imperative is discovered by 
practical reason and self-legislated by a rational act of the will, and therefore it is self-
enforced.109  As such, the effect of the categorical imperative is that citizens obey the 
state law irrespective of who legislates it, since the law was made by the citizens 
themselves.110  Thus, Kant demonstrates a non-instrumental obligation to obey law, 
which for him is comprised of the dictates of practical reason contained in the categorical 
imperative, an internal function that produces compliance to law.111   
 
In this way, the Kantian categorical imperative may be observed as a version of the 
Pauline law of love, since the law of love is a universal law of nature and is self-enforced 
by conscience.  However, the main point of difference is that for Paul the source for the 
‘categorical imperative’ is transcendent and external (God), but for Kant the source is 
immanent and internal (self).  Nevertheless, there is significant agreement between the 
Kantian theme of internal conviction by conscience and the Pauline notion of obeying the 
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civil authorities for the sake of conscience. As established above by Žižek, Badiou, 
Douzinas and Aquinas, a necessary condition for obeying the law of love according to 
Paul is the fact that it convicts in conscience.  It is the inner transcendental authority that 
compels the subject to obey the law by virtue of self-subjection and self-legislation 
resulting in self-enforcement.  Paul has specific regard to this in Romans 2 and Romans 
13, as well as understanding it to be part of the new covenant accessible to all people 
through practical reason, as Finnis explains through Aquinas.  Thus, there are again 
strong connections between Paul’s argument that the civil authorities should be obeyed as 
an internal conviction of conscience by the law of love, and the natural law motif of 
obedience to an internal function which produces compliance to law.  This dimension of 
the law of love is an important component for considering features of an alternative 
Pauline foundation for the authority of law. 
 
C  Conclusion: The Alternative Foundation of the Law of Love 
 
Paul’s central argument regarding the law is that the law of the letter, a series of negative 
prohibitions to be adhered to, is no authoritative basis for a legal system.  Indeed, this 
formulation of law necessarily results in disobedience due to the created desire to 
transgress – it is a curse leading to death, in order to prepare for the coming of faith.  
Instead, one should aim to follow the spirit of the law, the single positive transcendental 
principle to love your neighbour as yourself, which by definition fulfils the law, for love 
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does no wrong to a neighbour.112  This central Pauline theme provides considerable 
illumination on the nature of authoritative law for contemporary discussion. 
 
Firstly, the law itself must have some transcendental genesis.113  Contrary to the positivist 
tradition where there is no necessary connection between law and morality, it is precisely 
the transcendental source of the law that binds the subject in conscience to obey it.114  
Without this self-subjection by virtue of the ‘inner voice’, authority does not inhere in the 
law for the subject, and there is therefore no obligation for the subject to obey, resulting 
in an impotent legal system.115  Although this incorporates aspects of Kantian natural law 
ethics, it surpasses Kant by locating an objective/external source for authoritative law, 
rather than it being subjective/internal.  In this sense, it is more clearly expressed in terms 
of the Žižekian ethic to do your duty, and the Pauline injunction to obey the civil 
authorities for the sake of conscience, since they are from God.  For Paul, similar to 
Aquinas in this sense, the ultimate transcendent source for authoritative civil law is the 
axiom to love your neighbour as yourself (a prescription for virtue based on natural law), 
the divine spiritual law which obliges obedience to the civil authorities.   
 
Inextricably connected with this is the crucial fact observed by Badiou that prior to the 
event of Christ’s resurrection, no one has any reason to love themselves.116  As such, 
faith in the resurrection (in Badiou’s sense of publicly declaring the possibility of life) is 
a necessary condition for the efficacy of the principle to love your neighbour as yourself, 
since if you do not love yourself you will not love your neighbour, causing the collapse 
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of the entire system.117  However, this faith is only effective through love.  Hence, 
Pauline faith and love are in a symbiotic relationship and inextricably form the 
justification for an entire legal system.  Without the transcendent law of love in 
conjunction with faith, following the reasoning of Badiou’s Paul the entire system of 
valid civil law is destroyed.  This insight sits in a subtle tension with Aquinas and Finnis, 
who argue that the natural law may be universally accessible through human reason, 
without the requirement for faith.  It may be possible to resolve this tension in light of the 
fact that for Finnis and Aquinas, human reason is given by God, and the basic values of 
practical reason (such as the law of love) are reinforced by faith in God.  Hence, although 
participating in the natural law and providing a solid foundation for a legal system does 
not require faith as such, it does assume a theological or transcendent framework.  Such 
is apparent in the way Aquinas (with Paul) acknowledges secular enforcement of the civil 
law within a theological framework of law instituted by God, so that both the secular and 
the theological may co-exist in society.  It can be seen in a similar fashion through the 
way that Kelsen, a positivist, acknowledges the (natural) law of love as a paradigm of the 
basic norm. 
 
On this point, a second valuable insight is that the Pauline law of love is a Kelsenian 
basic norm which can found and authorize a valid legal system.  As explicated above, it 
presupposes and fulfils obedience to the civil authorities, providing the content for a 
system of valid norms/civil laws.  For example, a law against murder can be derived from 
the principle to love your neighbour, because it is wrong to murder your neighbour and 
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love does no wrong to a neighbour.  However, it is important that the derivation of norms 
from this basic norm does not disintegrate into an infinite number of prohibitions, for this 
would reproduce the same issue of desire/transgression that the law of love is attempting 
to eliminate.  It remains an issue of contention as to how a system of norms can be 
validly derived from the law of love while avoiding the promulgation of numerous 
prohibitions.  Thus, although it is necessary that the law of love be a basic norm, the issue 
of implementation requires further discussion. 
 
Finally, the law of love provides a unique perspective for considering the issue of civil 
disobedience, and the validity of laws that are considered unjust.  For example, if a civil 
law is considered to be against the law of love, it must be disobeyed even though it is still 
considered a valid law, for the principle of love transcends the bare requirement for 
obedience, again similar to the Thomist position.  However, the subject who disobeys the 
law is nevertheless subject to punishment from the civil authorities, as exemplified by 
Paul’s own life.  The issue of why civil authorities acting against the law of love still 
have the discretion to punish legitimate disobedience is not addressed by Paul, and 
requires further analysis beyond the scope of this essay. 
 
Nevertheless, Paul gives a unique basis for discussing the authority of law.  Law must 
have a transcendent source, with the law of love being the basic norm for a valid legal 
system.  He simultaneously provides the transcendence for law sought in the natural law 
tradition in conjunction with the ability to disobey the civil authorities, and the authority 
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and sanction for civil authorities to actually oblige obedience which the positivists seek.  
In this fashion, the Pauline perspective is far more comprehensive than the individual 
traditions in terms of explanatory scope and general explanatory power.  However, a 
disadvantage is that the individual explanatory powers of natural law and positivism are 
undermined in the Pauline perspective, since for example the obligation by internal 
conviction of conscience due to the law being from God is offset by the sanction of the 
civil authorities to compel obedience.  Furthermore, there is an issue as to how to 
implement the law of love as the basic norm without creating the same violent cycle the 
law of love endeavours to resolve, and why civil authorities acting against the law of love 
still have scope to punish those who disobey them.  Hence, Paul allows and anticipates 
the combination of natural law and positivism to explain the authority of law, but further 
discussion and analysis is required to comprehensively explicate this.  Fundamentally, at 
the most practical level, Paul’s axiom to love your neighbour as yourself is a valuable 
principle of life for all subjects, providing a transcendent authority resulting in obedience 
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